Volume 5 1936~1939


Doc No.
Date
Subject

No. 351 NAI DFA 219/7

Confidential report from Francis T. Cremins to Joseph P. Walshe (Dublin)
(Confidential)

Geneva, 26 August 19391

With reference to previous minutes regarding the general situation, I have to state, for the information of the Minister, that in the present crisis public opinion in Geneva remains remarkably calm. Practically everyone clings to the hope that, despite the measures which are being taken in Germany against Poland, and the counter-measures in other countries, the actual outbreak of war may even yet be avoided. There is general commendation of the fresh appeal made by the Pope and of those made to Italy, Germany and Poland by President Roosevelt, and also of the statement broadcasted on behalf of the Oslo Powers by King Leopold. Meanwhile people are simply waiting on events and hoping that it will not be necessary for the Western Powers actually to go to war to convince M. Hitler and M. Mussolini that they are in earnest. With the signature of the Anglo-Polish agreement there should hardly be any doubt now upon that point.

The German-Soviet Pact was a surprise to everyone, though there had been vague rumours in the English and other papers of the possibility of some change in attitude between the two countries following the trade agreement. The feeling of surprise was greatly accentuated by the terms of the pact itself which departed so widely from those of other non-aggression pacts into which Russia had entered, omitting as it does the clause under which aggression by one of the parties against a third would enable the other party to free itself from the obligations of the instrument.

My Estonian colleague tells me that he thinks that such a clause was inserted in the U.S.S.R.-Estonian pact of non-aggression at the suggestion of Estonia, as Russia was not at the time a member of the League. It was intended to enable Estonia to obtain its freedom from the obligations, if the other party committed any act of aggression against a third State.

The whole circumstances of the German-Soviet Pact appear to be regarded in nearly all circles here as a cynical performance, and a serious let-down for Britain and France and their allies on the one hand, and for Japan on the other, the balance being against the Western Powers. There appears however to be a slump in its effect, a fact which it is alleged here is beginning to be appreciated by the two Powers of the Axis. I have heard the pact condemned also in Spanish circles favourable to General Franco.

No doubt Russia felt it highly desirable in her weakened situation to relieve her western front in case of possible trouble in the Far East. She would now, if the pact lasts, be free to concentrate her strength against Japan while also in a position at will to threaten her immediate western neighbours - Poland, Romania and the Baltic States especially Finland. Further, the opinion is freely expressed here that the traditional Soviet policy has found at last a possible opportunity of coming into play: a war between the democratic States and the totalitarian States which would leave both sides exhausted would admirably suit the policy of Russia, which might hope at an opportune moment to find the circumstances favourable for dictating a Soviet peace. Japan may however prove to be a brake on any such ambitions. In Swiss circles, the policy of non-recognition of Russia adopted by Switzerland, which it was decided a day or so ago to continue, is certainly more than ever approved.

From many quarters, I hear that in Italy, up to yesterday at any rate, the general feeling was that there would be no war - and war is certainly not wanted there, especially on the question of Danzig - but Italians of course regard the whole question from their own angle - they consider that the so-called policy of encircling Germany has failed, and that, in consequence, the democratic powers will not go to war to help the Poles.

Such indications as the fact that hostilities have not broken out so far in Eastern Europe, the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, and the reported journey of the British Ambassador at Berlin to London give the impression today that the position is somewhat less tense than it was yesterday.

[signed] F.T. CREMINS

1 Initialled by Michael Rynne as read by him on 30 August 1939.