At 3.45 p.m. I saw Sir John Maffey, and after sympathising with him on the loss of the ships 'Prince of Wales' and 'Repulse'² and a short chat about the war, I told him that I had discussed Mr. Churchill's message with the members of the Government, that they had agreed with me that it would be wiser not to go over to London at the present time. I then handed him the following message which was amended by my adding the words 'or your representative here'.

'From Mr. de Valera to Mr. Churchill, Personal Private.
Thanks for your message. Perhaps a visit from Lord Cranborne would be the best way towards a fuller understanding of our position here. Details of the visit could be arranged through our High Commissioner or your representative here'.

After some talk on the effect of America's entry into the war he asked whether I should consider it over on my mind what would be the effect of American representations with regard to the danger of the German and Japanese representatives as a danger centre for possible messages of information about British and American forces leaking out from here. I said that we would have to give the same answer to the U.S. that I had to the British, said I ought to let my mind work on the possibility of some half way house – make an inventory so to speak of the German methods of communication which he surmised.