In two conversations with Mr. Haller,¹ which ranged over a wide variety of subjects, he referred to his dealings with Irish subjects during his period with the Abwehr. Among the points he made were the following:-

1. The German Secret Service had always had difficulties in its dealings with Ireland because of Dr. Hempel’s opposition to any activities of this kind. Dr. Hempel’s view, which prevailed with the German Foreign Office, was that secret service activities in Ireland were both futile and dangerous, as they might bring about the end of Irish neutrality which the Foreign Office regarded as a major interest.
2. The Goertz landing was arranged by the Secret Service without the knowledge and in opposition to the wishes of Dr. Hempel. According to Mr. Haller, the Secret Service had not, up to then, been receiving intelligence reports from Ireland although they were, as is well-known, in contact with IRA leaders from here who had come to Germany by design or accident (Sean Russell,² Frank Ryan³). In this connection, Mr. Haller mentioned that Mr. Helmut Clissmann (who subsequently came to work for the Abwehr) had not, in fact, done any intelligence work for the Germans during his period in Ireland before the war.
3. Mr. Haller mentioned the visit by Messrs. Veesenmayer and Clissmann to Madrid in 1942 to see Mr. Kerney. The reason for that visit, he said, was that the Foreign Office could get ‘nothing out of the then Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin’ (Mr. Warnock)⁴ and that they hoped to learn more about Irish official thinking and, in particular, the attitude of Mr. de Valera through Mr. Kerney who was, of course, already known to Mr. Clissmann. Mr. Haller says that he saw Mr. Veesenmayer’s report on his visit and that it was, from the German point of view, ‘disappointing’. Mr. Kerney had simply adopted the formally correct attitude of a neutral head of mission and declined to hold out any hope that Ireland would be likely to come in on the German side, or at all. This account runs, of course, contrary to the version published by Professor Desmond Williams in his articles in the Leader and in the Irish Press.
4. As regards the purpose and results of the German Secret Service activities in relation to Ireland, Mr. Haller spoke in rather veiled and not entirely consistent language. He said that they wished to preserve contacts with ‘underground elements’ here so as to be able the more easily to help resistance in the case of a British landing. He was disposed to discount the idea that there had been any serious possibility of a German landing. He also discussed, however, although without mentioning names, the aid given to Germany (before Pearl Harbor) by Irish-American extremists in notifying or sabotaging shipments for Britain. I understood that contacts with such elements was made easier and their confidence secured, by means of Sean Russell, Frank Ryan and Goertz’s contacts here (although, to judge from some cryptic remarks of Mr. Haller, Goertz’s contacts gave more trouble than they were worth). In general, although Mr. Haller did not specifically say so, I gathered the impression that he and his friends in the Abwehr valued their IRA helpers more as decoy ducks for use in relation to the vital area of American aid for Britain, than for any very serious plans in relation to Ireland itself.

   As I was not in the Department at the time of which Mr. Haller spoke and as, even if I had been, I would have been much too junior to know anything about the high political matters to which he referred, I was not in a position to evaluate what he said or even to frame questions which could elicit useful new information. On Mr. Haller’s mentioning to me, however, that he frequently visited London, I suggested that he might call on Ambassador Boland who would, I believe, find a certain historical interest in hearing what he had to say. I was able to check through other sources that Mr. Haller was, in fact, what he purported to have been and I believe that his account, although certainly not the whole truth, is unlikely to contain actual misstatements. His attitude was of one discussing a historical situation which had long passed away and was unlikely ever to present itself in the same terms again.